Follow-up report covering the period 29 May to 31 August 2006

 

 

A. Introductory remarks
As the developments in Sri Lanka since the Geneva talks in February 2006 have been in phases, so will this report, with each addition covering a separate time period. The first report covered the time between 24 February and 16 April, the second report the time between 17 April and 28 May, and the third report the time between 29 May and 31 August.

 

 

1. Preamble
The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) met in Geneva 22-23 February 2006 for talks on the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA). The GOSL and the LTTE committed themselves to respect and uphold the CFA and reconfirmed their commitment to fully cooperate with and respect the rulings of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The GOSL and the LTTE also pledged to take all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no intimidation, acts of violence, abductions or killings.

 

This report is an assessment based on information collected by SLMM Monitors, including information on alleged and confirmed violations of the CFA and the Parties compliance to SLMM determinations from 28 May till 31 August. Under points 2 and 3, the report is divided in to two parts; 29 May to 25 July 2006 (further referred to as Period 1) and 26 July to 31 August 2006 (further referred to as Period 2). The reason for this division is the radical changes seen in Sri Lanka during these two periods.

 

The general number of complaints increased somewhat in the reporting period, however, the number continued to be on a relatively high level in a few of the districts. During the second period, the number of complaints went down radically in most districts, but this was most likely due to the escalating tension particularly in Trincomalee and Jaffna, making it more difficult to receive and inquire in to complaints. As such, this report will analyze the situation in a broader perspective and recommend measures which could strengthen the implementation of the CFA.

 

GOSL and LTTE overall commitment to the CFA

Period 1
The period started up with an agreement to resume the plans regarding sea plane transportation of LTTE commanders. However, as the agreement included the condition of LTTE being allowed to carry side arms, the discussions once again culminated in nothing, when this was not accepted by the airline. No further discussions were held on the possibility of LTTE reopening their political offices inside GOSL controlled areas.

 

Even though the majority of the reporting period remained calm and quiet throughout the AOR, the number of violent incidents and attacks continued on a high level, thereby stirring up tension under the surface of things.

 

Retaliation turned tougher from both sides, and where there earlier had been possible to a certain extent to foresee the moves taken by either side, this now became impossible.

 

The high number of attacks directed towards the GOSL forces continued, in several cases also involving the injuries and deaths of civilian bystanders. The period saw several high profile attacks, such as most notably the assassination of 13 Sinhalese workers in Wellikanda on 30 May, the claymore attack on a civilian bus killing 65 and injuring 70 in Kebitigellewa on 15 June, the attack on Pesalai church killing 8 and injuring 38 civilians on 17 June, the suicide attack on the SLA Deputy Chief of Staff outside Colombo on 26 June, the clash between SLA and LTTE in Vakaneri on 14 July, killing 12 SLA soldiers and 4 LTTE cadres, and finally the closing of the Mavil Aru sluice gate on 22 July, the last leading to the major escalation of violence in period 3. The retaliation to several of these attacks was severe and seemed less restricted than in former periods. Additionally the movements of Sea Tigers both on the Eastern and Western coast increased, leading to several smaller and medium sized sea skirmishes.

 

Period 2
As the tension increased severely towards the end of period 1, period 2 saw the situation escalating out of control on both the East coast and in the Northern areas, when direct fighting between the parties broke out in Trincomalee district on 26 July and in Jaffna area on 11 August. This situation also increased tension on other parts of the AOR, and both Musalai/Nannadan areas and the Vavunatheevu area turned unpredictably unstable.

 

Accusations were made by both sides as to who was responsible for the escalation, however both sides maintained that the CFA was still in effect, and that the military actions taken were purely defensive, not aggressive.

 

The most notable attacks during the period, were the assassination of 17 local employees of ACF in Muttur on 4 August, the killing by claymore attack of an STF commander in Kandy on 6 August, the shelling in an area near Mavil Aru on 6 August, when it was known that SLMM was present, the assassination of the SCOPP Deputy Secretary General in Colombo on 12 August and the air strike on a training site in Sensoolai, killing at least 40 on August, as well as the claymore attack on the convoy of the Pakistani High Commissionaire in Colombo on the same date.

 

 

2. Intimidation, acts of violence, abductions and killings by GOSL and LTTE

Period 1
The level of tension between the civilian population and the armed forces continued to be high, as the number of attacks on GOSL forces stayed on a high level, retaliation in form of assaults on and harassment of civilians did the same. During this period, the attacks also directly involved civilians on a much regular basis than before, something that did not diminish the civilian distrust in the armed forces, and that made them attempt to stay as far away from any soldiers as possible. A total number of 209 attacks on the SF took place, killing 78 and injuring 129 staff, both military and police.

 

Shelters used by civilians were also targeted in this period, most notably when two hand grenades were thrown in to a church where civilians were gathered following a sea battle between Sea Tigers and SLN off the coast of Pesalai on 17 June. The incident killed 8 people and injured 38, as well as upsetting the otherwise relatively calm situation in the area.

 

At least 230 civilians were killed during the reporting period, as well as a similar number injured; several of them from being in the area where attacks on the GOSL forces took place.

 

Vavuniya took the highest toll of killings, as a civilian bus was targeted by two claymores on the road near Kebitigellewa on 15 June. 65 civilians were killed and 70 injured in the attack, leading to retaliating attacks in the Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Killinochchi districts. Fortunately these retaliations did only cause minor damages.

 

In Batticaloa the number of killed reached 50, the majority of whom were civilians. Two major incidents upped the numbers considerably, the first being the assassinations of 13 Sinhalese workers in the Omadiyamdu village NE of Wellikanda on 30 May, also resulting in the fleeing of several families from the area, and the second being a roadside mine incident in Wadamuanai on 6 June, killing 9 and injuring 13.

 

Attacks continued also in Colombo, when a suicide bomber targeted the SLA Deputy Chief of Staff, killing him, as well as three other soldiers.

 

Period 2
The overall situation became tense and unpredictable with large scale military confrontations starting on 26 July in the Muttur/ Sampur area south of Trincomalee related to the closure of Mawil Aru sluice gates by the LTTE restricting the access to water for the population living in GOSL controlled areas. GOSL forces continued their military operations aimed at gaining control over the sluice gates and suppressing the LTTE forces in the area. LTTE responded by shelling the Naval Base in Trincomalee, attacking SLN ships and with military offensives into GOSL controlled Muthur.

 

The situation further worsened with large scale military confrontations spreading to Jaffna peninsula on the 11 August. LTTE advanced over the Forward Defence Line near Muhamalai Entry/Exit Point and cadres landed on several beaches in the South and on Kayts and Mandaitivu Islands outside Jaffna town. LTTE claimed that they were just responding to SLA artillery attacks, but considering the preparation level of the operations it seems to have been a well prepared LTTE initiative.

 

LTTE artillery fire reached as far north as Palali Air Base grounding all in and outgoing flights. As a result of the fighting Jaffna became completely closed off for all civilians and SLMM with no possibilities to leave the GOSL controlled area.

 

Towards the end of the period, fighting intensified in the Trincomalee area, with the GOSL adamant on gaining control over the Sampoor area, which had been more or less under LTTE control since 1997. Due to this, heavy shelling continued from the Trincomalee Army and Navy bases, as well as attacks coming from the South of Sampoor. This development also led to further escalation in the Batticaloa area, with more or less constant shelling ongoing in Vavunatheevu towards the end of the reporting period.

 

The main attack linked to, but still outside the direct fighting, was the killing of 17 local employees of the French organization ACF, on 4 August in Muttur. All 17, 14 men and 3 women were killed execution style in the compound of the ACF office. All but one was Tamils, the last Muslim.

 

An air strike took place in Soosalai on 14 August, when SLAF bombed what they claimed was a LTTE training camp west of Mullaitivu. It was later confirmed that a former children’s home had been targeted in the air strike. All small children had however left the compound earlier to make space for a few hundred young females attending what LTTE called a live-in first-aid course.

 

At least 40 persons were killed and more than 100 injured in the attack. SLMM was not able to confirm the GOSL claims that the girls were given military training.

 

At least 250 civilians were killed during the reporting period, with at least an additional 415 injured. In addition to the assassinations continuing in several districts, a large majority of the victims were killed in relation to the fighting in Trincomalee and Jaffna.

 

An increased LTTE activity targeting GOSL VIPs in the southern part of the country was noted. The STF Director of Training was killed in a claymore mine attack not far from his home in Kandy on 6 August, and a senior EPDP member survived a bomb attack in central Colombo, but his driver and two bystanders, were killed on 8 August. The Deputy Secretary General of SCOPP was assassinated in his home in Colombo on 12 Aug - the anniversary of the killing of the late Foreign Minister, and on 14 August there was a Claymore attack targeting the Pakistani High Commissionaire’s convoy and killing seven people.

 

 

3. Presence and activities of armed groups
Continued attacks on LTTE forward defence localities throughout the period showed that one or more armed groups were actively engaged in offensive operations against the LTTE. SLMM were able to verify 4 attacks/clashes in which the perpetrators/second party either came from or fled to GOSL controlled areas; the attack on the LTTE in Pavatta on 18 June, the clash between Karuna and LTTE in Mankerny on 27 June, and two attacks on the LTTE installations in the Batticaloa district in week 30.

 

The continued high number of assassinations of civilians, including LTTE supporters, in the East, as well as numerous reports of harassment of civilians strongly indicates that armed groups operates in that area.

 

SLMM received a large number of complaints relating to assassinations, harassments, extortions, assaults or abductions where an armed group is the main suspect. SLMM District Office in Batticaloa has also been contacted by individuals claiming to be Karuna members.

 

The only clearly identified armed group is the Karuna faction and their political front TMVP who, contrary to the GOSL commitment, became even more visible in GOSL controlled areas in the East. There are a number of indications that the GOSL is actively supporting the Karuna group. Known Karuna supporters have been seen moving to and from SLA camps, and it is evident that the security forces and police in some areas are not taking action to prevent armed elements from operating.

 

 

4. Child recruitment
Child recruitment and child abduction continued on a relatively high level in June, July, August, however unlike earlier months, a majority of the cases reported were not against the LTTE, but against the Karunas. While it is evident that LTTE was behind most of the child recruiting as confirmed by several of the victims and the LTTE, there are also strong indications that the Karunas were behind several of these abductions.

 

SLMM is aware that some underage children freely volunteer or leave their families due to economic reasons to join LTTE. Nevertheless it is still against international law to accept them for training or use them for military purposes.

 

 

5. Other violations of the CFA
Both Parties continued to reinforce their forward defence localities following several incidents of cross fire exchange across FDL in the North in July-August, following the escalation in violence in Trincomalee, and the subsequent similar escalation in Jaffna.

 

On 22 July the sluice gates at Mavilaru were closed. The LTTE claimed that the gates were closed by the People in the area, as a reaction towards the failure of the GOSL to develop the water supply on the Tamil side of the area. However, the sluice gates are in an LTTE controlled area, and the LTTE has shown a strong reluctance towards intervening in the situation and help reopen the sluice gates, thereby creating a humanitarian problem in the area.

 

Following the closing of the Mavilaru sluice gates on 22 July, the GOSL started a massive military offensive operation in the surrounding areas like Sampoor, and while conducting this operation restricted the Freedom of Movement of SLMM monitors in the area on several occasions, as well as by their shelling of the Mavilaru area on 6 August, after being informed of the SLMM presence, deliberately set the security of SLMM monitors at risk.

 

In the evening of 17 August, LTTE attacked a number of SLN installations near DO4 accommodation north of Trincomalee and the monitors had to take shelter as shelling and small arms firing continued throughout the night. As in the shelling on 6 August, this incident as well, seeing that the LTTE were fully aware of the SLMM presence, once again put the security of SLMM monitors at risk.

 

Additionally through these actions large numbers of innocent civilians have been killed and tens of thousands have been forced to flee the area concerned, thereby creating a humanitarian crisis and an enlarged IDP situation in the Eastern part of Sri Lanka.


6. GOSL and LTTE cooperation with SLMM and compliance with SLMM rulings
The LTTE is still not providing full freedom of movement to the SLMM. Although the situation has improved slightly, it remains a problem, especially in areas where SLMM needs immediate access to inquire into alleged violations. Such restrictions make already difficult tasks even more challenging and add problems to SLMM’s possibility to determine on alleged violations.

 

The denial of Freedom of Movement from the GOSL side was evident in July-August, following the closing of the Mavil Aru sluice gates, especially affecting the Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts, as the district offices were time and again denied entry to the areas affected by fighting, both in the main fighting area, but also in the area where most IDPs have gathered.

 

During the hostile actions in the Jaffna area, SLMM monitors got closed in both in Jaffna and Kilinochchi. Both sides showed strong reluctance towards assisting the SLMM to get the monitors out.

 

Both Parties were still very reluctant to comply with SLMM rulings. Additionally, the Parties did during the latter periods show a strong resentment of SLMM rulings, claiming that SLMM was biased towards the other Party. It must be said, though, that these accusations have come more often from the Government side, together with complaints of SLMM not being quick enough to rule cases against the LTTE. LTTE on the other hand issues similar complaints regarding the time span of complaints, and has also shown a stronger reluctance to their commitment of providing security for SLMM members. Both parties have at times proven extremely difficult to contact, especially in situations where immediate contact is necessary.


7. Conclusive remarks
The violence has increased severely during the reporting period and serious violations of the CFA have been committed.

 

The GOSL’s commitment to take all necessary measures in accordance with the CFA to ensure that no armed group or person other than Government security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations in GOSL controlled areas has not been implemented. GOSL is responsible for maintaining law and order in all GOSL controlled areas and this includes preventing operations by criminal, paramilitary and other unofficial armed groups.

 

Child recruitment was an issue both sides promised to deal with in the period after the Geneva talks. Neither side has complied with this so far, as in addition to the regular child recruitment continuing on the LTTE side, additional abductions and recruitments are now being done by the Karuna faction on the East coast, without the GOSL making any attempts to curb this development.

 

The Geneva meeting gave an opportunity to the Parties to move forward and improve the situation. The initial positive forward looking atmosphere was however quickly changed into reality as the GOSL remained unwilling to implement all of its commitments and instead denied even the mere presence of armed groups.

In addition the GOSL showed little willingness to accept requests by the LTTE aimed at normalizing the situation. SLMM fears that the resumptions of attacks against the GOSL security forces were the LTTE’s way of putting pressure on the GOSL.

 

The escalation of the violent situation in the East and North, going as far as to direct fighting on the ground does not create a conducive environment for discussions or negotiations. The results of this escalation are several ten thousands of people displaced and in need, high numbers on both sides killed in action and in situations relating to the fighting, as well as hundreds of innocent civilians killed and injured just through living in the areas affected by the conflict.

 

Both sides should take immediate actions to stop the fighting and attempt a return to the negation table, in order to spare the lives of the Sri Lankan people.

 

SLMM gets too many complaints that should have been dealt with by the Sri Lankan legal system. At present, the civilian population, especially in the Northern and Eastern area has very little to no confidence in the system, leading them to try to get their cases through SLMM.

 

Both sides must look at what measures can be taken to change this development, develop a functioning legal system and thereby increase the population’s trust in the institutions of the country.

 

The Parties must start looking at what measures they can take to strengthen the CFA and improve the situation instead of focusing on the faults done by their counterpart. Direct dialogue on all levels should be re-established as a first confidence building measure. SLMM also recommends that the Parties look closer to the Vienna Document 1999 to find well proven confidence and security building measures which could be adapted to the situation in Sri Lanka.

Major General Ulf Henricsson
Head of Mission
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission